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/For information on the influence of Communist propaganda over Chinese literary and humanistic activity, see category 116, pp. 227-241/

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668 own dramatic troupes to play the approved
536 repertoire, now brought to villages by traveling troupes. Special mobile teams
668 trained to deliver organized "cultural lectures"
208 or to show films dramatizing the "New Order" have been moving through the countryside. The old exchange of visits with relatives in nearby towns now has its Communist counterpart: interchange of visits between urban and rural workers' groups to observe one another's "progress in Communist reconstruction."[25]

668 The seasonal pilgrimage, in company, to some famous shrine also has its Communist counterpart: mass pilgrimages to Mao Tse-tung's native village, which is being publicized as a national shrine.[26] Despite its frontal attack on the old familism, the Communist government last year provided special trains to take city dwellers back to their native villages for the holiday; a mass exodus was reported from Peking.[27]

996 Ch'ing-ming is no longer an approved
668 festival, presumably because of its function

25. Enlightenment Daily, Jan. 23, 1955, p. 2.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid. Also, SCMP, 972, 1954, p. 21. We have no data on this for the Southwest.

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665 of at least 200 people, in order to supply two
666 or three representatives. A voter-qualification examination board is established; only those who pass the examination may receive the electoral certificate. Committees at the hsiang level directly control the selection of candidates through negotiations between the Party representatives and representatives of mass organizations within the election committee.

Although the election of the People's congresses above the county level must be conducted by secret ballot, the election of deputies to the People's congresses of a hsiang, town, municipal district, and the election of hsiang or a town deputy may be conducted byeither secret ballot or a show of hands (Article 55).

665 During the period prior to the general
• 208 elections of 1953 and 1954, the Party
666 accelerated its program of propagandaand indoctrination. Every phase of the campaign was designed to induce mass participation and greater adherence to Communist values and objectives. Szechwan was the center of an especially intense propaganda campaign.[66]

66. New China Daily, May 16, 1953, p. 1; also May 30, 1953, p. 1.

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665 666 208 Fifty nine thousand election handbooks were distributed by some 180,000 specially trained propagandists, many of them members of the Szechwan Federation of Literature and Art Circles. Among other devices used were 34 mobile motion picture projection teams, 400 slide-projector units, innumerable "cultural" exhibits, and periodic radio broadcasts. 665 668 Election personnel were chosen from various Party, governmental, and mass organizations. Students also were widely used. For example, in Kweichow some 400 students of political science and law, together with several hundred graduates of the Provincial Institue of Nationalists, served as election officers.[67]

The result of the election was a foregone conclusion. In all provinces, between one-fourth and one-third of the deputies elected to the Provincial People's Congresses were members of the Communist Party.[68] Most non-Party deputies enthusiastically supported the Party's program. It would seem that, like most elections in Communist states, the general elections of 1953 and 1954 were

67. Ibid., May 19, 1953, p. 3.

68. People's Daily, March 21, 1954, p. 3; also April 28, 1954, p. 3.

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constantly patrolled, and each village near the right-of-way must maintain a specially organized force for this purpose and participate in the guard duty for a 72-hour period every month.[40] In addition, the village maintains a militia in which all the young residents must serve. Besides training or participating in the unit's cultural and indoctrination activities, the militia patrols key areas in the village, guards government grain, helps in loading it for shipment, and assists in keeping the village free of bandits. Misuse of the militia by the Southwest China Military Command in 1953 was criticized as having wasted 24,700 man-hours per day.[41]

Similar public and military services are required of city dwellers. They must engage in military training, participate in the local military unit's cultural and organizational activities, and serve on patrols in their own or neighboring areas whenever needed.

Controls imposed upon the people by security agencies and other organizations

40. Ibid., Nov. 11, 1951, p. 4.

41. Report of the Second Southwest China Militia Conference, Ibid., May 20, 1953, p.1.

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208 have been frequent causes of public discontent. The large-scale rationing program enforced in the cities and the constant investigations conducted by public security agencies cause a great deal of anger, if not outbreaks of violence. To some extent, at least, the Communists recognize the limits of public inconvenience and dissatisfaction. The regime seeks to offset disaffection by emphasizing in its propaganda the necessity and patriotism of individual sacrifice for the national welfare. If some non-vital aspect of the Communist program occasions bitter and widespread complaint, the regime bends to public opinion and institutes changes. Wherever possible, the Communists attempt to avoid the flagrant use of threats and force in approaching and controlling the public. Nevertheless, the regime has been far from successful in preventing public discontent.

B. Tension within Organizations

578 The use of various overlapping control agencies to supervise and ensure the execution of Party directive has created suspicion and tension within the control agencies themselves and the supervised state, Party,

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Annex "A," Subparagraph 2g,
Political Background

PROPAGANDA AND PUBLIC INFORMATION

I. SCOPE OF DISCUSSION

208 In Communist China, public information lays a heavy stress on propaganda and education. As is true of all Communist countries, the Chinese People's Republic is guided by the inviolable principle that all facts and issues must be selected and interpreted in the light of Marxist theories and whatever the current Party line dictates. Limited by source materials of a regional character, the following discussion on public information and propaganda in Southwest China will attempt to cover only the basic facts about the formal structure, operations, and government control of the principal media of mass communication in the region. Wherever possible, exemplary cases in each medium will be included.

II. PRESS

A. News Services

204 Before the Communists occupied the Southwest China Region, the nationalist government-operated Central News Agency played a leading part in supplying the newspapers in this area with materials. Services of foreign press associations were available. Dispatches from such

214 is a collection of articles by different authors,
814 as collective authorship has become a fad in Communist China. About a hundred pages is the average length of most of these booklets, and 5" x 7", the usual size of their format. A few photographic illustrations at the beginning of the work depict the "peaceful liberation of Tibet" and the scenes along the route traveled by the Communists army. The picture showing how Communists Army cadres give medical treatment to the native people is a tell-tale selection reflecting the purpose of the whole booklet. In the preface, the editorial department of the publisher states that the publication is designed to show the "greatness of Chairman Mao Tse-tung's troops, and their contribution to the Tibetan people." Depsite its minor flaws, the book seems to be well prepared, well presented, and very readable to people with a basic command of Chinese.

214 Subheadings such as "The Kindness [of the
208 Communist Army] Is as Deep as the Ocean" on page 94, and "Our Tibetan Brothers and We Have Become One Family" on Page 92, need no elaboration on their propaganda slant. There is a good deal of excellent descriptive material, emotion-packed, sweeping, and touchingly vivid. An objective evaluation of such writings cannot but lead to the conclusion that the propaganda pens of trained Communist writers are skillfully used and, judging by this particular sample, the writers seem to have a sincere feeling for the subjects they are treating in the book.

204 Clues to the contents of the magazines in this region are found in their titles which often specificy the reader groups for which the publications are intended. The titles of the articles are also self-explanatory. The "Good News for Our Mother Country," in Southwest Literature, No. 13, eulogizes the achievements of Communist China; the "Hero's Blood Nurtures Flowers of Victory" in Southwest Women, No. 19, praises patriotism of the Chinese dead on Korean battlefields, thus giving consolation to their widows who may be reading this magazine at home. The "Sing and Cheer for 1953" in Songs and Verses of Yesterday and Today, No. 24, recounts Communist success in 1952 and entertains a rosy prospect for the new year. The Popular Pictorial in its first 1953 issue is loaded with news photographs, showing, of course, the promising side of every subject,and "New Year" paintings designed for the readers to clip off and use for decorative purposes. These paintings are a good propaganda medium of which a fuller discussion is presented in the chapter on "Artistic and Intellectual Expressions."

214 207 Are the people in Southwest China reading these books and pamphlets? According to Table 8, about one out of four persons during the first half of 1951; and about one out of two persons bought three copies during the period of July 1951 to September 1952. This is better than the records available for both Central-South and East China for the same periods. (In Central-South China,

214 about one out of ten persons bought a copy during
208 the twelve months from September 1949 to August 1950. In East China, one out of eight person bought an item during April-November 1950.) Again, these figures may reflect gross exaggerations for propaganda effect. Anti-Communist press reports have given accounts of how the mainland people bought books and newspapers under duress.[24] Some of these reports may have factual bases as the Communist cadres, intent on carrying out Peking's orders, abused the book promotion program by cajoling the people into purchasing the publications. Nevertheless these cases did not involve the minority of the book buyers. Three days before the third volume of Mao Tse-tung's Selected Works appeared in Chungking bookstores, the New China Bookstore posted an advance announcement. According to the Enlightenment Daily of Peking, "crowds of readers rushed to the New China Bookstore in Chungking at the break of dawn on April 10, 1953 to await their chance to buy the book."[25]

Such manifestations of enthusiasm on the part of the book buyers may not be a common occurrence in Southwest China, as the Communists would like to have the world believe, but undoubtedly the books are read and understood at least by the literate segment of the population. Among the minority peoples in western Szechwan and southwestern Yunnan, books printed in their own languages have been rare. Consequently, Communist books printed in such languages have little

24. Szechwan Under Communist Rule, p. 27.

25. Enlightenment Daily, Peking, April 11, 1953, p. 1.

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208 difficulty in finding eager buyers.[26]

4. Libraries and Cultural Centers

217 In order that financial strain may not curb the people's desire to read, the Communists in Southwest China have designed and established small libraries throughout this region to serve the workers, farmers, and shopkeepers. Librarie already in existence in larger cities were reorganized in 1949. According to anti-Communist reports, the original collections at these old libraries were all destroyed by the Communists and restocked with propaganda pamphlets. The Communist press admitted a wave of book burning in 1951-52.[27] However, that cultural disaster was said to have most seriously affected Central-South China and, to a lesser degree, East China. There has been no specific report on book destruction at any particular place in Southwest China. The small libraries established by the Reds numbered thirty-eight, with a total of 3,255,000 volumes by September 1952.[28] About twenty of those libraries were found in Szechwan Province.

368 The cultural center is a version of the Communist cultural palace on a smaller scale. Both are provided for Communist-conducted cultural activities such as discussion group meetings, political rallies, and reading classes. The larger

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363 26. There is no information on the exact scope of distribution of books printed in minority languages in this region. However, it has been Peking's policy to promote such distribution wherever national minorities are found. In 1951, a [continued next page]

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gather around him wherever he goes. About 1,000 of these couriers were on duty in Szechwan Province in January 1955,[31] but there is no information available on how many such couriers there are altogether in Southwest China. 203

There are also popular science programs designed to educate the public in basic scientific knowledge. But in comparison with East and North China, this region is lagging behind in the development of this type of program, for it has yet to report the establishment of any "science education center."

D. Application and Effectiveness of the Press as a Propaganda Medium

Having thus examined the organization and operation of the Communist press in this region, let us see how the Communists have made use of the press for propaganda propaganda purposes, and if their effort has been successful. However, because the Communist experiment with the press in this region is still new and information on it is even more scarce than that of the other regions, our findings can hardly be expected to be too conclusive. At any rate the following observations on the characteristics of the Communist press in Southwest China are made with a view to providing some understanding of the problems involved. While some of these characteristics may tend to hamper the response of the people in the region to 204 208

31. Szechwan Under Communist Rule, p. 26.

204 the press operated by the Communists, others
208 may enhance it.

1. As a part of their reorganization of the press, the Communists in Southwest China have started a concerted drive to "reform" the thought of the newspapermen. A salvo is fired at the traditional beliefs of the journalists, and a new professional standard established. The new standard is to report the facts selected and interpreted for the sole purpose of educating the readers to support government policy. As a result, the body of information the public receives via the newspapers is restricted to only what the government deems fit for public consumption. The same standard applies to magazines, books and other publications. Writers are subject to the same screening and indoctrination. Those who have failed to be converted simply have to give up writing as a profession.

Although in this region there has been no incident involving severe penalty meted out to politically "undesirable" writers, the execution of six journalists in Canton in 1951 has produced far-reaching repercussions and will remain as a warning to those who tend to deviate from the official party line. Subsequent literary purges that time and again jolted the literary circles in China will also contribute to the submissiveness of writers. (For a more detailed discussion on literary purges, see chapter on "Artistic and Intellectual Expressions.") The response of the press to every turn of the political wind is instantaneous and done with amazing efficiency.

204 As soon as Peking decides to weed out wavering
208 elements from the party ranks, regional newspapers will pick up the message and splash it all over their front pages. The next day local papers will follow suit. In the course of a week pamphlets harping on the same theme will flood the book market. Throughout the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns, the "Resist-America-Air-Korea Movement, the "Anti-American-German-Warfare" Movement, and the "Oppose American Effort to Revive Japanese Militarism" Movement, the press in Southwest China answered the call as quickly as the newspapers and pamphlets in any other regions of China.

2. The Communists are always keenly aware of the importance of making newspapers easy to swallow for the masses. Early in their underground days they made a motto of O. A. Piatnitskii's utterance that "revolutionary newspapers must be written in plain and popular language so that they can be understood by the masses."[32] In Southwest China, where public education has been even less developed than in North or East China, the newspapers catering to uneducated and semi-educated readers are making a special effort to carry out the long-established policy of "explaining the political problems in the simplest possible terms."[33]

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32. A translation of this article appears in Hung-ch'i [Red Flag], Jan.15,1932. Osip Aronovich Piatnitskii, who wrote such standard treatises on Communist propaganda and agitation as the World Economic Crisis: the Revolutionary Upsurge

[continued next page]

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208 Ch'u T'u-nan, chairman of the Cultural and Educational Commission for this region, took pride in announcing in 1951 that this policy was observed in the development of the southwestern press. Not only did the newspapers strive to move closer to the masses, Ch'u said, but the books published also went more than half-way to meet the needs of workers, farmers, and soldiers.[34] In most of the publications, local expressions and trade jargons are freely adopted. To a person trained in classical Chinese and accustomed to reading the serious writing of pre-Communist days, the new language of the Communist press would sound strange if not unintelligible. Yet the new language style, accentuated by the occasional use of words and expressions of minority-languages, could possibly increase the popular appeal of the newspapers. One other factor that contributes to the effectiveness of the press as a whole is the Communist drive to eliminate illiteracy. In the reading classes, mimeographed news bulletins, wall newspapers, and other handy means of news communication are employed. Although these

[32. continued] and the Tasks of the Communist Parties, and World Communists in Action, was idolized by the Chinese Bolsheviks in the early 1930's.

33. Red Flag, March 10, 1932.

34. New China Daily, Chungking, October 1, 1951, p. 3.

204 smaller papers are not as elaborate as the New
208 China Daily of Chungking, they contain the same basic political messages in boiled-down versions. This seems to coincide with Lenin's theory that an "agitator uses a few words to present a single idea." [35] Anybody studying the Communist press at work will do well to remember the enticement to a semi-illiterate person of a printed message he vaguely understands. He will want to read it again and again until he feels that he has understood it fully. The ability to read has always been highly treasured in China. (See chapters on "Family" and "Social Structure.") Thus, Communist propaganda has been contributing a great deal to whetting the intellectual appetite of the semi-illiterate class in this region as a whole.

3. It would be misleading to compare the Chinese Communist press with the U. S. press and to judge the former's effectiveness accordingly. To begin with, the Chinese Communist press has never permeated community life to the same degree that the U. S. press has. Except for a small section of China's urban population, no Chinese will feel that he has missed something if he has no morning paper to read at the breakfast table. However, it may be said that the Communists in this region are helping the people to cultivate a newspaper reading habit by means

35. David Shub, Lenin, New York, The American Library of World Literature, Inc., 1954, p. 31.

of organizing news paper reading groups and other encouragements. The reading of newspapers or having newspapers read and explained to him is exciting to the average peasant on a Szechwan farm or in the western Yunnan mountains. Since he has no previous experience which he can compare with the present one, he will hardly know what else there is to be desired in a newspaper other than what he finds there. Compared with North and East China, the Southwest has an even smaller sophisticated population. To the unsophisticated, the press in Southwest China is conveying a good deal of new information.

4. While the Communists are feeding the public with their diatribes, using the press as a spoon, they are also bringing to the public a considerable amount of much-needed rudimentary knowledge on the natural sciences, public health, and sanitation. This may not particularly be true of the New China Daily because it has as its primary mission the interpretation of government policy to the public. But as an established policy, the Communists have been assigning local papers the duty of carrying special columns devoted to various popular sciences and technical subjects suitable for their readers. In addition, there is at least one magazine for each of the population segments in Southwest China; for youths there is the Southwest Youth Biweekly; for women, the Southwest Women Monthly; for mechanical workers, the Mechanical Worker, etc. For each periodical on a certain subject, there are dozens of pamphlets published every year to reach readers of varying

204 degrees of education. The propaganda angle in 208 most of these publications is obvious. Even the most technical treatises do not neglect to contrast the present with the past. The past is treated with disdain and its shortcomings are blamed on the "reactionary Kuomintang" or "American imperialism." The present, however, is praised and excessive credit is given to Mao Tse-tung or Russia.

5. Another general criticism voiced by anti-Communist elements is that the newspaper in Communist China as a whole contains very little timely news. With the Communist system of censorship and double-checking, news dispatches are often delayed before they reach the press. However, it must be noted that lack of promptness in reporting news may not seriously impair the effectiveness of the controlled press in South China as a medium of propaganda; many of the readers are unsophisticated, and to them the Communist press, regardless of its content, possesses a great appeal because it is something new and exciting.

6. Two developments may impair the effectiveness of the press in Southwest China. One is the lavish use of statistical data to support or refute an issue. Although so far no gross inaccuracies have been discovered in the major newspapers here, cases involving inaccurate reporting have

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204 208 been exposed in the Central-South China press.[36] Bent on propagandizing as it does, the Southwest China press is always faced with the danger of carrying propaganda too far. As the reader in time becomes more sophisticated, inaccurate reports will destroy his confidence in the press. The Communists claim that they are trying to be careful. They have even gone so far as to standardize the usage of punctuation marks, something which has never attracted the attention of the Chinese press.[37] The other development is the action taken by the Communists in Southwest China in response to a Peking order to restrict the circulation of local newspapers to their own respective districts only.[38] According to anti-Communists sources, this move is designed to "hide the deplorable conditions of one locality from the knowledge of those in another locality." The Communists explain it on the grounds of economy and planned distribution. Whatever the true reason is, this move will, in the long run, tend to impair the effectiveness of the press when newspapers cannot freely circulate from one place to another. Books and pamphlets in this region seem to be free from this restriction.

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36. The expose of inaccuracy in the New Hunan Daily, a major regional paper in Central-South China, was printed in Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily], Peking, April 22, 1954.

37. People's Daily, Peking, September 26, 1951.

38. Central News Agency dispatch quoted in Review of Hong Kong Chinese Press, No. 174, American Consulate-General, Sept. 19-20, 1953.

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207 Newspaper advertisements in this region show that in 1953 basic facilities for radio reception were available in the market. Four- and five-tube receiving sets, operating on either direct or alternating current, were for sale in Chungking. Batteries, loud-speakers, and microphones could also be bought. Some of these supplies were possibly manufactured in Chungking.[46]

There is no later information on radio facilities in this region,[47] but the expansion of receiving stations is believed to be still in progress.

B. Operation and Audience

207 & 208 The programs of these broadcasting stations are organized to deliver and explain

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46. Ibid., January 1, 1953, p. 5.

47. Some statistics on radio in China, however, are available. In March 1953, there were 20,591 receiving stations, 15,850 listening groups, and 32,667 receiving officers. In addition, there were many special listening groups of women, children, and neighborhood units organized in special districts. Over 85 per cent (or about 1,800) of the nation's hsien have such stations, including minority banners and leagues. Chin Ta-k'ai, "Chung-kung Ti Kuang-po-wang," ["The Radio Network in Communist China"], China Weekly, No. 65, March 29, 1954, pp. 10-12.

207 political messages to the audiences. The
208 pattern is fixed and changes in content occur in accordance with the commands of central authorities. If the current issue is "Resist-America-Aid-Korea," then everything on the programs is anti-American propaganda. If it is "Production Emulation to Greet Labor Day," then every speech or news item has something to do with model workers and heroes. The following table is a survey of the programs presented by the Southwest Regional People's Broadcasting Station and the Chungking Municipal People's Broadcasting Station in June 1953:

Table 11. Radio Programs in Southwest China (1953) */

Program (daily)	Time (in minutes) Southwest	Chungking
Rebroadcast of Peking program and nat'l hookup	90	90
Lessons in Russian	60	60
Literature	45	75
News	15	15
People's Liberation Army programs	105	--
Music, announcements	35	95
Calisthenics	---	20
Women, children, and other programs	---	30
Tibetan-language program	20	--
Total	370	385

207 */ New China Daily, Chungking, May 31, 208 1953, p. 4.

In 1953, the stations in this region were broadcasting twice or three times a day. The regional station was on the air from 6:00 to 7:00 and from 18:10 to 23:20, broadcasting on 570 and 6,154 kilocycles. The Chungking Municipal Station's schedule was 6:00-7:35; 15:50-17:00; and 18:50-22:30, on 1,300 kilocycles. Common to both stations were the rebroadcasts of Peking programs, consisting of "important" speeches by high government officials and lectures. When a national campaign like the preparation for the general election in 1953-1954 was on, a portion of radio time would be devoted entirely to a national hookup organized and controlled by the Central People's Station in Peking. Studying Russian has been in vogue in Mainland China, hence the daily allocation of almost one-sixth of broadcasting time to this purpose. Literature programs included reading of poems and stories whose central theme never varied from praising the working class and the achievement of the Communist regime. Since many "news" items were covered in the rebroadcasts and other special programs, the comparatively small portion of time devoted to news reporting was used to give summaries only. In our foregoing discussion of the press, it has been shown how news items in Communist China resemble feature stories; the same difficult exists when one attempts

207 to draw the line between news and other features
208 on the radio program. The initial musical number to start the day's broadcasting was either "All Red the East," or "We Sing for Our Motherland," two most popular tunes in Communist China. There was no evidence of the use of works by western composers on the prgrams in this region, although in 1953 the stations in Shanghai featured the works of Beethoven. Local operas and plays were occasionally used to fill the music hours.

Liberation Army" and Tibetan-language programs were special features of the regional station for Southwest China. Correspondence from writers assigned to army units on the Sikang-Tibet Highway constituted the bulk of the materials broadcast for regional and even national consumption. "How our Troops Conquered the Difficulties in Building the Sikang-Tibet Highway," "Our Recreational Club in the Liberation Army," and "Learn from the Russian Army," [48] were some of the common subjects presented on the Army program. On this program, brief items of news were also read. Radio monitors attached to the Army used these news reports to run their mimeographed or wall newspapers for the troops. The Tibetan-language hour was designed to serve the minority nationals in northwestern Szechwan Province. It consisted of summaries of the day's important items.

Calisthenic lessons were broadcast early in the morning, while special programs catering

48. New China Daily, Chungking, June 4, 10, 2, 1953, p. 3.

207 to women, children, and other groups were left
208 to the municipal station which served a more limited audience. The regional station also went on a slightly different schedule on Sundays to present more music and plays. The municipal station featured "dance music" on Saturday nights, but there is no report of the type of music used for dancing. In addition, the municipal station also broadcast a lengthy "worker's program" twice a day, except Sundays. A typical item on the "worker's program" was a speech by a labor hero. For instance, there was one by Yang Hu-k'un entitled "My Experience of Participating in the Seventh All-China Conference of the Federation of Labor Unions."[49] To entertain the workers, the program carried "live" broadcasts direct from the theaters on Saturday nights.

Like the content of the press in this region, the radio programs in 1953 also laid heavy stress on "economic reconstruction." Even the children's programs devoted considerable time to such a propaganda item as "My Father Has Become a Model Laborer," broadcast by Chou Ting-kuo, member of the Communist Young Pioneers.[50] Fairy tales and folk tales of both oriental and occidental origins were generally so

49. Ibid., June 3, 1953, p. 3.

50. Ibid., June 5, 1953, p. 3.

207 doctored as to carry the message of "how to be-
208 have like good children of Chairman Mao Tse-tung," or "how to help our parents to construct a socialist China." No commercials or "soap operas" were allowed on any program in this region.

The program of the Szechwan People's Broadcasting Station, inaugurated on October 1, 1952, was arranged in the same pattern. One interesting item was the "propaganda officer's"[51] hour, which provided the official propaganda personnel a radio forum to clarify the political issues of the day. The Szechwan station operated on 980 and 1,350 kilocycles.

C. Application and Effectiveness of Radio as a Propaganda Medium

The Communists in Southwest China claim that their radio networks, with minor shortcomings noted, have been a success. To evaluate this claim, it is necessary to take into consideration the following observations:

1. The control of radio broadcasting in this region has been complete. Since there were not as many independent stations in this region as in East China at the time of Communist occupation, the problem of reorganizing the stations in Southwest China was a relatively simple one. However, since every step from broadcasting to receiving is directly and closely supervised by the government and the Party, the entire system could easily be

51. New China Daily, Chungking, October 2, 1952, p. 3.

207 brought under effective control. However, the
208 first sign of anxiety was visible at the First National Radiobroadcast Workers' Conference held in Peking from December 1 to 11, 1952. Among the dangerous trends pointed out at the conference were the following: (a) the editorial departments of radio stations failed to establish a close tie with the masses; (b) the issues raised in the programs did not sufficiently reflect life in reality; (c) there were wide gaps in overall planning and technical guidance.[52] To remedy the situation, the conference concluded, . . . more regimentation and centralization were needed in radio work. Hence, there seems to be little possibility for any local station to use its own initiative; if it tried, it would be accused of "deviation" and subject to severe penalties.

2. Lack of facilities remains a stumbling block to expansion of radio work. In addition to such measures as "wire broadcasting station," radio news bulletins, blackboard and wall newspapers, the Communist in Southwest China have been following the nation-wide practice of sending mobile radio teams to the countryside. These mobile teams carry radio sets with them and, upon reaching a village, organize listening groups to hear some of the special programs. Such a measure has proven effective when the Communists have a special campaign to carry out. In

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52. Chin Ta-k'ai, op. cit., pp. 10-12.

207 the cities, similar listening groups are also
208 organized to support any campaign. During the "Resist-America-Aid-Korea" Movement, "good results" were reported in Chungking and its vicinity. One admitted drawback was that these listening groups would break up as soon as the special campaign was over. Better organization is needed if any lasting effect is to be expected of the propaganda, according to report.

3. The Communists in Southwest China assign only trusted Party members to key positions in the radio network, but there are apparently not enough well-trained personnel (technical and otherwise) to meet the need. As a result, each provincial broadcasting station has been conducting its own personnel training program. While much may have already been done to improve them, these training programs, begun in 1950-51, leave much to be desired. Many of the radio receiving officers are given only two months of training. During such a short period, these candidates are supposed to "elevate the level of their political understanding and formulate a new revolutionary outlook on life." Actually, some of the trained receiving officers have failed even to acquaint themselves with standard Mandarin pronunciation and intonation. This has resulted in their inability to monitor correctly the messages broadcast from Peking or from provincial stations. Radio technicians are, in most cases, given a six-month training course. Their doubtful competence, plus the shortage of radio parts, has subsequently caused many receiving stations to stop operation.

207 208 4. One success of the Communist radio program is to be found among the students, particularly among the younger ones. At school, radio listening, like newspaper reading, has been made part of the regular curriculum. With Communist Youth Corps members acting as leaders, daily news items are discussed and analyzed with a view to guiding the thinking of the students in the direction of favoring the Communist regime. When the fall of Seoul was broadcast in 1951, receiving officers were directed to explain the setback as a strategic necessity, not as a sign of defeat, lest the students become skeptical of the Communist slogan, "The U. S. is but a paper tiger." There is evidence that most of the students are quite willing to accept such Communist propaganda and are enthusiastic about their Communist leaders.

5. The national hookup programs to support propaganda campaigns are probably the most effective broadcasts. Co-ordinated with the press, these radio programs are given advance notice and the masses are psychologically prepared for them. During the land reform, this technique was employed to agitate the people to rise against the landlords. During the "Resist-America-Aid-Korea" and the subsequent "Germ Warfare" campaigns, students and soldiers were encouraged to tell over the radio their sentiments toward "American warmongers." When the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns were being promoted, citizens were urged to report on "corrupt officials" and inefficiency in government agencies. According to Communist statistics, from March 1

207 to May 31, 1951, the forty-nine People's broad-
208 casting stations throughout Mainland China organized 389 such national or regional hookup broadcasts. Over 36,000,000 people were said to have listened to the programs and the stations received 186,000 letters, telegrams, and telephone calls as evidence of favorable response.[53] Photographs are available in Communist publications, showing old peasant women crying under a loud speaker which is supposedly relaying a live broadcast of how a "People's enemy" is brought before a mass trial, or a youth shouting in response to the radio's call for additional manpower to suppress counterrevolutionaries, or a young country girl beaming broadly upon hearing the news of the promulgation of the new marriage law. These pictures, of course, could be other than what the captions claim. But there is no denying that the Communists have resorted to every conceivable means of mass persuasion and that radio is being fully exploited in Communist China for propaganda purposes.

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53. Jen-min Hua-pao [People's Pictorial], Peking, October 1951, (no pagination).

slides on a large scale, but in 1953 such equipment was advertised for sale in the New China Daily of Chungking. Slides on maternity hygiene, public health, educational subjects, and current events were available in the market at that time. A set of 36 slides was sold for JMP$130,000 (about US$26, official rate) which was equivalent to the price of 200 pounds of rice.[67]

Phonograph records are used at the cultural centers and recreational clubs, but not as extensively as lantern slides and radio sets. They were also available in Chungking in 1953 for JMP$16,000 (about US$3.20) each, or about the price of 23 pounds of rice.

V. MASS ORGANIZATIONS AS MEDIA OF PUBLIC INFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA

The Communists are fond of using the word "network" for activities pertaining to public information and propaganda. Already discussed in this study are the news-gathering network, radio network, library and book distribution network, and motion picture showing and cultural center network. Included in the Communist term of "cultural network", however, are many mass organizations contributing to the dissemination of public information, education, and propaganda.[68]

One of these organizations is the Sino-Russian Friendship Association. Established on October 5, 1949, in Peking, it expanded rapidly and by February 1952 had 64,200 large and small branches

[next page for 67. and 68.]

575 208 with a total membership of 23,000,000.[69] Under the direction of Liu Shao-ch'i (chi), whose position in the party hierarchy is said to be only next to that of Mao Tse-tung, this association, through its omnipresent branches, has been organizing, indoctrinating, and propagandizing people of all professions. It holds small group gatherings in which Soviet theories and practices are presented, discussed, and analyzed, while its members and their friends are urged to emulate their Soviet comrades. Whenever there is a national propaganda campaign, the association mobilizes all its branches to give concerted support to the effort.

Since detailed discussion on mass organizations in China is presented in a separate chapter in this handbook, no attempt is made here to mention the names of all the major ones and to discuss their activities. Suffice it to say that these organizations all have their own "cultural departments" which in reality are information and propaganda units. Generally speaking, the "cultural network" of an average-size hsien may easily consist of as many as 4,000 units with more than 30,000

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67. Ibid., January 17, 1953, p. 3.

68. A list of 96 such national mass organizations is found in People's Handbook, 1955, pp. 7-8.

69. People's Handbook, 1952, p. 258.

575 people actively partici pating.[70] Although these 208 statistics may not be true of many of the sparsely populated hsien in Southwest China, the scope of the Communist public information program and the effectiveness of the Communist propaganda machine is not to be underestimated.

V. PERSONAL CONTACT

208 Any study of public information and propaganda in Communist China would be sadly incomplete if the important part played by personal contact were ignored. Personal contact actually has been an effective tool in the dissemination of public information and propaganda in a country like China where a preponderant percentage of the population is illiterate.

The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on January 1, 1951 issued a directive on the "Establishment of a Propaganda Network Aimed at the Masses." Among other things the directive pointed out that: (1) In the past propaganda work had been neglected, and no permanent personnel had been assigned to conduct person-to-person propaganda to counteract rumors and clarify government policies. (2) All Party branches from that day on would assign propaganda officers, and all guiding agencies in the Party would appoint reporting officers, while enthusiastic activists, although non-Party members, might also be appointed as propaganda officers. (3) Under the direction of the Party, propaganda officers would conduct propaganda by means of

70. Chao Ts'ung, op. cit., p. 36.

708 personal contact and report the people's reactions and responses to the proper authorities. (4) Reporting officers were required to make political reports to mass meetings at least once every two months, and their reports had to be first cleared by Party authorities.[71]

Execution of the above directive in Southwest China resulted in the registration of 85,000 propaganda officers by December 1951.[72] A different Communist source claimed that by the end of November 1951, incomplete surveys showed that there were already 2,086 reporting officers and 86,349 propaganda officers in this region.[73] By September 1952 the number of propaganda officers had increased to 158,000.[74] In the summer of 1953, Sezchwan Province alone reported that there were altogether 180,000 propaganda officers at work.[75] At about the same time, Communist authorities began to strengthen

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71. Chien-li Hsüan-ch'uan-wang [Establish Propaganda Network], Shanghai, Hua-tung jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1951, pp. 1-6.

72. People's Handbook 1952, pp. 436-437.

73. New China Daily, Chungking, December 23, 1951.

74. Chin Ta-k'ai "Chung-kung Hsuan-ch'uan-wang Ti Fa-chan Chi Ch'i P'o-ch'an" ["The Development and Bankruptcy of the Chinese Communist Propaganda Network"] , China Weekly, No. 70, May 3, 1954, p. 11.

75. People's Daily, Peking, May 29, 1953, p. 1.

208 the system of personal propaganda by establishing what might be described as "coaching stations" for propaganda officers. At these stations propaganda officers met twice a month, each session lasting about two hours. With the help of experienced coaches, the propaganda officers received on-the-spot instruction on how to disseminate propaganda and how to make their argument convincing to the people. Unfortunately, there is no information available on the exact number of such coaching stations in this region.

Anti-Communist sources claim that the establishment of such "coaching stations" is evidence of the collapse of the Communist person-to-person propaganda system.[76] Communist reports, however, maintain that propaganda and reporting officers have come to be regarded by the people as "information bureaus" that know all the answers. They are also being referred to as "thought doctors," and "messengers of Chairman Mao Tse-tung." If these appellations really reflect the high esteem that the people have for these propaganda agents, then the Communist claim that personal contact "has exerted decisive influence on the masses in the campaigns to suppress counter-revolutionaries, carry out land reform, resist America and aid Korea, and increase production" is perhaps not entirely unreliable.[77]

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76. Chin Ta-k'ai, op. cit., p. 12.
77. People's Handbook 1952, pp. 436-37.

208 The significance of the part played by personal contact in the Communist propaganda scheme is well expressed in an editorial of the People's Daily. The Party has been relying on separate propaganda campaigns to achieve the goals, the editorial said. At first, Party members thought that personal contact was essential to the successful dissemination of propaganda. Now everybody admits that "propaganda officers are trail-blazers without whom nothing can be undertaken."[78]

VII. CONCLUSION

A. The Massiveness of the System

208 666 The Chinese Communist propaganda machine makes use of all types of media which are coordinated to function effectively. Once a decision is made by the top members of the Party hierarchy, it will be transmitted to Party and government agencies at lower levels for execution. Then a sort of chain reaction will begin. Take the 1954 general election, for instance. The decision was made in Peking in early 1953. By May all the provinces had already organized special committees

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78. People's Daily, Peking, 1953, p. 1.

208 666 to carry it out. Meanwhile from Peking came detailed instructions embodied in the General Election Handbook, of which 1,380,000 c pies were distributed throughout the country. Discussions on the forthcoming election filled the pages of the press and consumed the bulk of radio time of all the major broadcasting stations. Provincial authorities further printed thousands of pamphlets for distribution. The Shantung provincial branch of the New China Bookstore alone handled more than 16,000 copies of these pamphlets in the first half of May 1953. By June all the propaganda officers were mobilized, briefed on the subject, and assigned to work. In Szechwan Province, 180,000 propaganda officers worked feverishly. More than 400 lantern slide teams took to the back roads and side roads of the province; about 440 cultural centers staged co-ordinated programs.[79] Every unit of the public information and propaganda system was put to work. It was claimed that, mainly on the basis of this immense propaganda campaign, the turnout of the election was close to 90 per cent of the nation's total eligible voters. Such a claim might have been exaggerated, but the effectiveness of such an intense campaign 208 should not be totally discredited. After all, during China's War of Resistance against Japan, the propaganda teams organized by the Nationalists succeeded, in 1938-40 at least, in making the villagers of western Szechwan aware of the national leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, and the grave situation

79. People's Daily, Peking, May 29, 1953, p. 1.

208 created by the war that was threatening the very life of their own country.

B. The Thoroughness of Operation

Western journalists who visited the Communist areas during the brief lulls in the Nationalist-Communist war were surprised to find that the grade school children were quite familiar with Communist political jargon. Such an achievement is perhaps to be accounted for by the thoroughness of Communist indoctrination and propaganda. As soon as a child is old enough to be taught, he is subject to persistent Communist indoctrination. The first words he learns in grade school are "the Chinese Communist Party" and from then on he is taught to live for and think in terms of Communism. He would be an exceptional person if he could escape from becoming a devout Communist upon reaching adulthood. Perhaps occasionally from the older generation he will detect opinions or behavior at variance with Communist standards, but in Communist China the old and wise are dying out, and in twenty years they will be replaced by the new generation which has been thoroughly trained in Communist concepts and practices. It is the new generation that will run the country.

C. Prospects of Success or Failure of Communist Public Information and Propaganda

Are the people in Southwest China convinced by the Communists now? In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it seems that the majority of the -

208 people are willing to go along with their Communist leaders, or, for that matter, with any leader who has brought about a measure of order and stability to their community after so many years of chaos. As to the remainder of the population, it is difficult to gauge their feelings accurately, since so few Chinese have escaped from the Mainland to reveal their sentiments to the outside world. But if from this region there had been such refugees, it would still be risky for us to rely completely on their words for the measure of popular reaction in Southwest China to Communist propaganda. After all, refugees' stories, as has been proven before, usually are highly subjective and often tend to convert individual experiences into questionable generalizations.

It is also difficult to say how much counter-propaganda, if a way is found to bring it to Southwest China, will be enough to offset the Communist balance there. However, there is at least one danger that will confront the Communists in the future. After the masses have been taught to read and write, they are likely to become curious about the outside world and want to know more about it. The people in the Soviet Union now seem to be curious about the West after 38 years of Communist indoctrination and propaganda and total blackout of outside news.[80] Communist China is traveling on the path that the Soviet Union has trod. It is only reasonable to assume that the Chinese people

80. "Mr. Kleiner's Russia," Newsweek, September 5, 1955, p. 17.

• 208 will someday demand the right to satisfy their curiosity about the outside world, news of which has been denied them for so long.

arranged anti-choleric injections for all their faculty members and students, and advised especially the latter to refrain from careless eating. The attitude of these groups is that of modern science. In the meantime, the local hospital and the middle school put forth large notices advising the populace to take injections. The hospital at first gave any applicant free injections on the premises. Later on its authority sent out nurses to give free injections in the streets to facilitate matters, and made one injection an adequate dosage. The wife of a professor in the college who was a nurse before marriage also undertook to help and injected a number of local people. The local middle school and normal school posted large bills everywhere in the town. These bills were meant to be educative and were very detailed. One kind of pictorial posters shows the following: On one side are several street food stands retailing sweets, pea-curd, etc., swarming with flies. Several customers are seen eating these foods. On the other side of the poster are several people enjoying an open-air toilet, and several others vomiting. Flies also swarm on their stools and vomited stuff. The caption below the picture reads: "These flies in both places are the same flies and carry cholera germs from the one to the other."

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Another kind of poster shows in large pictures the structure of a fly, and of the cholera germ, with detailed and scientific explanatory notes on how these germs may be communicated and by what means such communication may be prevented.

A third kind of poster stresses the absolute effectiveness of the anti-choleric injection. It reads: "In West Town, the mortality rate from cholera alone is now about two in every hundred. But all the 1,400 members of the middle school, the normal school and the primary school have been injected and have not had a single case of cholera infection among them."

A number of these posters were posted side by side with the notices and announcements of a number of cholera prayer meetings.

It will be in order here to put in a note on who among the local populace have taken the injection and what ideas they have about it. On account of the author's limited time and financial support in the research he was not able to make as he had desired a large-scale inquiry on all local people who have taken the injection. Among these he has personally talked to only about thirty. These include two carpenters of about thirty-five years of age, one fisherman of thirty-one years of age, three cloth dealers, one of whom did business in Burma, a Chen Chang (or head of the sub-district), a member of the gentry, about 55 years of age, a former primary school teacher in a village (now a trader), five students from the local middle school, a cook who runs the "bachelors mess" for faculty members of the missionary college, one woman of thirty-eight years of age, and others. At the outset it may be stated that most of these took an active role in, or contributed materially to, one or another of the cholera prayer meetings. For example, old Mr. H, the member of the gentry who contributed two hundred fifty dollars to the prayer meeting in the street where his family lives, two hundred dollars to another which took place in a street still further off, was a manager in one prayer meeting and a director in another. The author met him in the prayer meeting that took place at Area E where he was a manager and had a long talk with him. He showed the author his left arm and said that all his children and grandchildren had been injected at the hospital. He expressed to the author his firm belief in the efficacy of injection; but later on in the conversation he said that even after injection, one had better appease the spirits a bit. "Who knows which

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